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In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward
trust. We consider two-player situations, where the trusted player, called the temptee, has a temptation
to betray. The strength of the temptation to betray varies from encounter to encounter. We set aside any
information about types and examine how reputations work when the temptees are the same in terms of
morals and self control. We refer to a recorded betrayal as a black mark and focus on mechanisms that only
reveal the number of black marks of a temptee. We show that the greater the number of black marks, the
less likely the temptee is to betray. We then study the dierent equilibria that emerge, depending on which
side of the market has the ability to specify the equilibrium. In closing, we generalize to cases where the
number of encounters is also recorded.
1. Introduction
In a typical business transaction, one or both parties have the potential to betray. A supplier
can produce low-quality goods; a debtor can default; an employee can steal; or a contractor can
break the deal. Betrayals are often avoided because temptations are modest or nonexistent. But
even when temptations are signicant, reputations can keep untrustworthy behavior in line. Thus,
betrayal is deterred, lest we lose future business with others, nd ourselves without future credit or
facing higher interest rates from any lender, or have great diculty nding a job. Many economic
models focus on repeat play, but often the concern with reputation comes from the broader world.
Personal interactions, as between friends, present the same situation, with temptations, betrayals,
and reputations all playing important roles.
Reputations are hardly sucient statistics. They rarely tell us everything or almost everything
about an individual's prior credit dealings or employment history. A typical employee reference
in these litigious days is likely to be: \Joe worked here for 12 years, and there are no recorded
blemishes on his record." Information on credit scores is equivalently crude. Repaying a loan counts
the same whether the terms were easy or harsh. If a minimum grade point average is necessary to
12
keep one's scholarship, it is irrelevant if one's courses are easy or hard. The Better Business Bureau1
only has information on the number of complaints for a business, but does not provide details on
each complaint. On the well-known and highly successful eBay reputation system, the summary
score tells us how many positive, neutral, and negative feedbacks a seller has received, but not the
highly relevant information of the prices of all the items that received negative feedback.2
In this paper, we study the black mark reputation mechanism, a mechanism where an individual's
reputation is simply a tally of the number of bad ratings or complaints that she has received. In a
broad range of settings, the reputation mechanism only keeps track of the number of infractions.
For example, the Better Business Bureau has information on the number of complaints for a
particular business, but not the number of transactions or volume of business that might have
led to complaints. On the other hand, in some instances, an infraction carries weight in and of
itself, and people do not think (or recognize) that the number of trials matters. This is in the
spirit of criminal justice systems, where the judge learns the number of convictions in a defendant's
past before sentencing, or some systems of sexual morality which look at the number of partners
someone has had.
Black mark reputations approximate settings where buyers focus on the number of negatives |
even if more reputation information is provided. A strongly negative rating is a black mark. The
Internet is now bristling with websites where users rate rms. They include Tripadvisor (for hotels
and restaurants), Angie's List (for service providers), and Yelp (for restaurants, attractions, etc.).
Participants give individual feedback scores after an encounter. Most rated entities, even those with
good average reputations, have some very low scores, usually from some disastrous encounters.
Some potential buyers focus on the extreme negatives: \The restaurant lost our reservation and
could not seat us;" \The plumber showed up 6 hours late, and left the place a mess." Businesses
presumably know that further highly negative encounters could be extremely damaging, and will
strive to improve their reservation system or their promptness.
We focus on two-player situations, where one player | the truster | decides whether to trust,
and the other player | the temptee | has the temptation to betray when trusted. We set aside
any information about types and examine how reputations work when all players are essentially the
1 www.bbb.org
2 The concern, of course, is that the seller would be generally trustworthy, but dishonest on rare occasions when
describing a very high-priced item. Information regarding sold items remains available for 90 days on eBay. It is
thus possible to scroll through to see the sale prices of recently sold items. This just complicates the strategy of
the dishonest seller, who must take a break after doing an untrustworthy transaction at a high price. In any case,
information that is prominently shown to buyers on eBay has a larger eect than information that is available but
harder to nd (Cabral and Hortacsu 2010).3
same in terms of morals and self-control. Behaviors dier in our model | as in real life | because
the strength of the temptation to betray varies from encounter to encounter. The tempted players
could be suppliers who might breach a contract that turns out to be too costly, contractors who
might do a shoddy job if it saves a lot of eort, employees who might miss work often when other
responsibilities are pressing, or spouses who might stray from marital vows given highly attractive
opportunities. The strength of the temptation to betray is then assumed to vary according to some
probability distribution.
This paper addresses two major questions.
(1) Are people with worse reputations more likely to betray?
(2) Do dierent equilibria for the treatment of reputations emerge depending on which side of
the market has the ability to specify the equilibrium?
The answer to even the rst question is hardly clear. Suppose we have a \two strikes and you're
out" system. Will a player with one strike be more likely to betray than a player with no strikes?
We show that in any pure equilibrium of a game where a temptee's reputation depends solely
on the number of black marks, the greater the number of black marks, the less likely the temptee
is to betray. Moreover, under certain probability distributions of the temptation's strength, the
likelihood of betraying decreases faster when the temptee's reputation consists of a larger number
of black marks.
It may seem counterintuitive that those with worse reputations would behave better. Our intu-
ition is led astray because we are used to reputational models that posit a dierence among types.
In such models, more betrayals indicate that one is a worse type, and can be expected to perform
worse. However, the model developed here focuses on moral hazard, which leads to a completely
dierent outcome.
The qualitative equivalent of the situation we address is seen in the Goldman Sachs (GS) situation
after its revenue was tarnished by allegedly proering portfolios designed by famed short seller
John Paulson, who wished to sell them short. GS allegedly did not reveal this highly relevant
information and is currently subject to both regulatory impositions and signicant lawsuits. Quite
apart from any legal action, its reputation has suered gravely. Holding GS's type xed, it now
seems much less likely that it would allow itself to engage in another ploy of this sort. Another
round of such allegations could be the death knell for GS as a leading investment house.
We address the second question by considering which pure equilibria are best for each of the
two players, that is, the truster and the temptee. We demonstrate that the preferences of the two4
players may in general be dramatically dierent. However, there are cases where both the truster
and the temptee prefer the same pure equilibrium, making a socially optimum available.
We then consider mixed strategies for the truster. That is, for at least one reputation value he
trusts the temptee with a probability that is strictly between 0 and 1. We focus on a special class
of mixed equilibria, at which trust is prolonged, and show that the temptee strictly prefers such
an equilibrium to a pure equilibrium.
In closing, we consider mechanisms that track both the number of black marks and the number
of encounters of a temptee, and show that the equilibrium behavior in the long run is identical to
equilibrium behavior under a black mark reputation mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature on
reputation. The problem formulation is given in section 3, and a general characterization of pure
equilibria is presented in section 4. Section 5 shows that in any pure equilibrium the temptee is
less likely to betray when she has more black marks. Section 6 studies how the equilibrium is
determined by the one who species it. Section 7 considers mixed equilibria. Section 8 considers a
setting where the truster knows both the number of black marks and the number of transactions
of the temptee. Section 9 discusses extensions to long-term relationships and section 10 concludes.
All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2. Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, in all prior equilibrium approaches to reputation, agents with high
reputations perform better.
Reputation is often studied in settings with both adverse selection and moral hazard. The agent
is assumed to have a type that her counterparts try to infer from her past behavior (for a survey
of such models see Mailath and Samuelson 2006). In this setting, an agent's reputation represents
the belief that other players have about her type, and the analyses focus on sorting among types.
An agent with a worse reputation is thought less likely to be of a good type and is considered
more likely to betray. For instance, Sobel (1985) considers an adverse selection model, where
one player (the sender) is either a friend or an enemy and the other player (the receiver) has a
prior belief on the sender's type; it turns out that an enemy is less likely to lie when she has a
better reputation. Imperfect monitoring (Fudenberg and Levine 1992), learning (Bar-Isaac 2003),
social norms (Kandori 1992) and settings where reputations can be bought and sold (Mailath and
Samuelson 2001) have been considered in models with both adverse selection and moral hazard.
By contrast, in the setting we study, the temptee does not have a hidden type. Reputation is
only used to incentivize good behavior. This approach has also been taken by Dellarocas (2005)5
in the context of an electronic marketplace, where the seller might betray the buyer; his paper
studies mixed equilibria in which the seller cheats (betrays) the buyers with some probability that
decreases with her reputation. Thus, a seller with a better reputation is less likely to betray.
Alternatively, agents can build reputations. Shapiro (1983) derives an equilibrium price-quality
schedule for markets in which buyers cannot observe product quality prior to purchase. At the
equilibrium, sellers initially invest in reputation in order to be able to sell high-quality items,
which can then be sold at a premium above their cost. The premium compensates sellers for their
investments in reputation. At this equilibrium, reputable sellers sell high-quality items; in other
words, high reputation sellers behave better.
Reputation has been extensively studied in the context of e-commerce. A number of papers have
empirically studied the eect of the seller's reputation on the average payment she receives in
electronic marketplaces. Some sample studies include data about eBay auctions for coins (Lucking-
Reiley, Bryan, Prasad, and Reeves 2007); Palm Pilots (Kalyanam and McIntyre 2001); Pentium III
processors (Houser and Wooders 2006); collectible coins, Thinkpads, and Beanie babies (Cabral and
Hortacsu 2010); and postcards (Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson, and Lockwood 2006). Finally, the
eect of dierent dimensions of a seller's reputation | assessed by considering text comments |
on pricing power has been studied on both Amazon and eBay (Ghose, Ipeirotis, and Sundararajan
2005, Pavlou and Dimoka 2006). On the other hand, a number of papers have considered the
question of designing a reputation mechanism that optimally incentivizes the seller (Fan, Tan, and
Whinston 2005, Aperjis and Johari 2010b, Ekmekci 2010).
Although we do not consider incentives for trusters to leave honest feedback in this paper,
another extensive line of research considers how truthful feedback can be elicited. In online markets,
players might undertake fake transactions in order to enhance their reputations. This stratagem is
unattractive, however, if a specic relation between the reputation premium and the transaction
cost holds (Bhattacharjee and Goel 2005). On the other hand, even if fake transactions cannot
be undertaken, buyers might not leave honest feedback after a transaction. Nevertheless, it is still
possible to devise a scoring system that induces honest reporting of feedback (Miller, Resnick, and
Zeckhauser 2005). In this paper, we posit that trusters leave honest feedback, since they have no
reason not to do so. We focus on the temptee's decision and its inuence on the decision to trust.
We do, however, allow for imperfect monitoring in our model, as various studies have shown that
monitoring is often imperfect in practice (Bolton, Greiner, and Ockenfels 2009, Dellarocas and








Figure 1 Extensive form representation of one-period interaction between C and D. (C's payo listed rst.)
3. Problem formulation
Players in the temptation game are divided into two roles, Cs and Ds, trusters and temptees, with
equal numbers of each in each period. For expository ease, those who must decide whether to trust
| trusters | are males, and those who are subject to temptation | temptees | are females in
our analysis.
In every period, each C is randomly matched up with a D. Then a C decides whether to choose
\trust" or \safe." If C plays trust, then D can play \reward" or \betray." If D rewards, then D
and C both get a unit payo. If D chooses to betray, then D will get a (1+ x) of payo, where x
is the strength of the temptation to betray. Its magnitude is the realization of a random variable
X drawn from a continuous probability distribution with density f(x).3 In each round, prior to
choosing whether she will reward or betray, D learns her x for that round, namely her level of
temptation. The value of x is and remains unknown to C. Thus, no information on the strength
of the incentive to betray is ever part of a D's reputation. If D chooses to betray, then C will
get a payo of  1. Figure 1 shows the extensive form representation of a one-period interaction
between C and D, where C's choices are circles and D's are squares, and C's payo is listed rst.
The analysis remains qualitatively the same if C gets a payo of  y when D betrays, rather than
 1, though of course the parameter values at equilibria will shift.
We note that the scaling of these payos is arbitrary. There is no implied interpersonal com-
parison. For example, in dollar value C may gain far more than D when each goes from 0 to
1.
We refer to a recorded betrayal of D as a black mark. The number of black marks a D has received
is known to a C when he encounters her. We allow for imperfect recording; that is, recording
3 It is possible to extend the results of the paper for the case where X has a discrete distribution in whole or in part.7
rewards as betrayals and betrayals as rewards. In particular, if D betrays, the number of black
marks increases by 1 with probability 1 r and remains the same with probability r. If D rewards,
then the number of black marks remains the same with probability 1  q and increases by 1 with
probability q. Perfect monitoring is a special case with r =q =0. We refer to the number of recorded
betrayals (or black marks), b, as the reputation of D. When monitoring is perfect, b equals the
actual number of betrayals. In general, however, it may dier. In the discussion below, when we
refer to betrayals as part of a player D's reputation we mean recorded betrayals or black marks.
At each round, each D has a certain probability of surviving to the next period, s. We leave aside
discounting, except as it arises through D's survival concerns. Absent discounting, the survival rate
for Cs turns out to be nonmaterial. After each round, if a D dies, she will be replaced by another D
who enters with a blank reputation record. Ds also leave the game (in our language get expelled)
if their reputation ensures they will no longer be trusted. We further assume that all players are
risk-neutral. The goal of a D is to maximize her expected payo until she dies or is expelled. The
goal of a C is to maximize his expected payo each period, since his actions have no eect on his
survival.
Key notation introduced in this and subsequent sections is summarized in Table 1. Table 1 also
shows some general assumptions we make on the model's parameters; as discussed in Section 4,
these assumptions are only introduced to rule out settings with uninteresting equilibria. In partic-
ular, we are assuming that the random variable X has a nite mean and a strictly positive median,
that the imperfect monitoring probabilities are not too large, and that the survival probability of
the temptee is strictly between 0 and 1.
4. Characterization of Pure Equilibria
In this section we characterize pure equilibrium. In the following sections we use this characteriza-
tion to show properties of these equilibria. Mixed equilibria are analyzed in section 7.
For the game to be in equilibrium, at each round, both C and D must have no incentive to
deviate from the strategies dening the equilibrium. C's strategy consists of whether he trusts D
as a function of D's reputation. D's strategy determines whether she rewards as a function of her
reputation b and her realization of X in that period.
For a xed strategy of C, let b be the minimum number of betrayals at which C does not trust
D. That is, C trusts when b < b and does not trust when b = b. Since C does not trust D at b,
D will never have more than b black marks. We thus refer to b as the cuto at which C stops
trusting D.8
Notation Denition Assumptions (if any)
X strength of temptation to betray EX <1
f(x) probability density function of X
m median of X m>0
r;q imperfect monitoring probabilities r+q <1
s survival probability of the temptee (player D) 0<s<1
b number of (imperfectly) recorded betrayals, or black marks
b number of black marks at which C stops trusting D
v(b) D's maximum expected innite horizon payo at b black marks
x(b) threshold on X below which D rewards, and above which she betrays
w(b) probability that D betrays when she has b black marks
Table 1 Notation used in the paper.
We rst consider the best response of player D when C uses a cuto b. Let v(b) be the maximum
expected innite horizon payo to D when her reputation consists of b black marks. We note that
if monitoring is imperfect (i.e., r +q > 0), then b may be dierent than the actual number of D's
betrayals. Since the cuto is b, C will never trust D once her reputation becomes b, and thus
v(b
)=0: (1)
For b2f1;:::;b  1g, v(b) is described by the following dynamic program:
v(b)=E[maxf1+X +s((1 r)v(b+1)+rv(b));1+s((1 q)v(b)+q v(b+1))g]
In particular, given that the realization of the random variable X is x, D chooses the action that
maximizes her expected payo. Should she choose to betray, her expected payo is 1+ x+s((1 
r)v(b+1)+r v(b)), since she receives 1+x now and her reputation deteriorates to b+1 black
marks with probability 1 r and remains the same (i.e., equal to b black marks) with probability
r. On the other hand, if D chooses to reward, her expected payo is 1+s((1 q)v(b)+qv(b+1)),
since she receives 1 now and her reputation remains the same (equal to b) with probability 1 q
and deteriorates to b+1 black marks with probability q. The temptee selects to reward or betray
depending on which action gives her the largest expected payo.
Straightforward calculations show that
v(b)=1+s(1 q)v(b)+sq v(b+1)+E[(X  s(1 r q)(v(b) v(b+1)))
+]; (2)9
where y+ max(y;0) is the positive part of y. Let
x
(b)=s(1 r q)(v(b) v(b+1)): (3)
Equation (2) implies that it is optimal for D to reward if X <x(b) and betray if X >x(b). Thus,
the set fx(b);b=0;1;:::;bg characterizes the best response of D.4




(We assume that X has a nite mean, so that E[(X  x(b))+] is well dened.)
Since D gets strictly positive immediate payment whenever she is trusted, the value v(b) is
strictly decreasing for bb. This is shown formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For a given cuto b <1, suppose that v(b) and x(b) satisfy (1), (3), and (4). Then
v(b) is strictly decreasing in f0;1;:::;bg.
If the level of imperfect monitoring is suciently high, namely if r+q 1, then it is impossible
to incentivize D to reward when the strength of the temptation to betray is positive (since then
Lemma 1 and Equation (3) imply that x(b)0). We are not interested in studying such cases and
assume that r +q < 1 throughout the paper. Lemma 1 then implies that x(b) is strictly positive
for b2f0;1;:::;b  1g.





if he trusts D; and 0 otherwise. We conclude that C trusts D if P[X <x(b)]>1=2; C does not trust
D if P[X <x(b)]<1=2; and C is indierent between trusting and not trusting if P[X <x(b)]=1=2.
Let m be the median of X, i.e., m is such that P[X < m] = 1=2. If m  0, then C always trusts
D at the equilibrium. We are interested in settings where this is not the case and thus assume that
m>0. We rst observe that, if m>0, then there cannot exist an equilibrium where C always trusts
D. In particular, if C always trusts D, then D's best response is to always betray whenever there
is a positive temptation to betray, i.e., x(b) = 0 for all b; however, C's best response to x(b) = 0
for all b is to never trust, since m>0. We conclude that b <1.
At an equilibrium, both C and D play a best response to the other player's strategy. The following
lemma gives necessary and sucient conditions for an equilibrium.
4 D is indierent between rewarding and betraying when X = x
(b). For expository simplicity, we assume that X is
a continuous random variable, so X = x
(b) with zero probability and it does not matter what D does in that case.
The results can be extended for the case that X has a discrete distribution in whole or in part.10
Lemma 2. A cuto b 0 and the set fx(b);b=0;1;:::;bg constitute a pure equilibrium of the
temptation game if the following conditions are satised:
1. x(b) is a best response of D to C's strategy, i.e., there exists a function v(b) such that x(b)
and v(b) satisfy (1), (3), and (4)
2. b is a best response of C to D's strategy, i.e.,
 x(b)m for b<b
 x(b)m
A pure equilibrium can be computed by recursively solving Equations (3) and (4) to obtain
x(b i) and v(b i) starting from the initial condition given by (1). Then, the cuto b and the
computed set fx(b);b = 0;1;:::;b   1g constitute an equilibrium if x(b)  m for b < b. On the
other hand, if x(b) < m for some b < b, then there does not exist a pure equilibrium with cuto
greater or equal to b.
We observe that there always exists a degenerate equilibrium where C never trusts D and D
never rewards, that is, b = 0. The temptation game has a non-degenerate equilibrium (i.e., with





is greater or equal to m. This follows by considering Equations (1), (3), and (4) for b=b  1.
Even though b <1 and, therefore, C does not trust D after a nite number of black marks, there
may exist equilibria at which cooperative behavior is sustained for the duration of D's lifetime.
Alternatively, if we interpret D's survival probability as a discount factor and the monitoring is
perfect, then cooperation can be sustained forever, along the lines of a folk theorem (Myerson
1997). In particular, suppose that b =1 and D always rewards when she has no black marks (i.e.,
P[X < x(b   1)] = 1). Straightforward calculations show that this is the case if the maximum
possible value of X is less than s(1 r q)=(1 s(1 q)). On the other hand, there may also exist
equilibria with b >1, where D may betray when she has strictly less than b 1 black marks, but
always rewards when she has b  1 black marks. For instance, if b = 2 represents an equilibrium
and the maximum possible value of X is less than s(1 r  q)=(1 s(1 q)), then D will betray
for X greater than some amount when she has no black marks, but will never betray after this.
Thus, in some sense, cooperation is sustained, with one betrayal. The outcome is similar for other
equilibria where the permissible number of black marks is greater.
In general, if there exists an equilibrium with cuto b =k, there also exists a pure equilibrium
with cuto b =k0, where k0 <k (assuming that both k and k0 are positive integers). Let B
pure be11
the maximum cuto b for which there exists a pure equilibrium. The value of B
pure depends on
the density f, the survival probability s, and the imperfect monitoring probabilities r and q.
5. Betrayal as a Function of Reputation
In this section we consider how reputations work. We nd that temptees are less likely to betray
when they have bad reputations, and that (for a plausible class of distribution functions) the
likelihood of betraying decreases faster when the temptee's reputation consists of a larger number
of black marks. The following proposition states this result formally.
Proposition 1. For every pure equilibrium (b;fx(b);b=1;2;:::;bg) of the temptation game,
x(b) is strictly increasing and convex in b for b2f0;:::;b  1g.
Proposition 1 shows that the threshold x(b) is increasing and convex in the number of black
marks. What are the implications of this result on how likely player D is to betray? Let
w(b)P[X >x
(b)]





be the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the random variable X.
The following corollary of Proposition 1 characterizes w(b).
Corollary 1. For every pure equilibrium (b;fx(b);b=1;2;:::;bg) of the temptation game:
(i) w(b) is decreasing in b for b2f0;:::;b  1g
(ii) if F is linear or convex, then w(b) is concave in b for b2f0;:::;b  1g
In words, in any game where a temptee's reputation depends solely on the number of black
marks, the more black marks to date, the less likely the temptee is to betray. This follows from the
fact that x(b) is increasing in b. It may seem counterintuitive that those with worse reputations
would behave better. Our intuition is led astray because we are used to reputational models based
on dierences among types; more black marks are seen as an indicator that one is of a worse type
and can be expected to perform more dishonestly. However, here we are considering moral hazard.
To be sure, in any one trial in our model, players D do have a type, namely the draw they receive
for X, their level of temptation. But this type does not carry over from trial to trial. Thus, there
is no learning about types.
In addition to showing that there is a decrease in the likelihood of betraying as the number of
black marks increases, Corollary 1 shows that if the random variable X is drawn from a distribution12
with a convex or linear CDF (such as the uniform distribution), then the more black marks to date,
the larger the marginal decrease in the likelihood of betraying. This follows from the convexity of
x(b). That is, under a convex CDF, the likelihood of betraying decreases faster when the temptee's
reputation consists of a larger number of betrayals. In other words, in this case the likelihood of
rewarding increases faster when the temptee has a bad reputation.
The structure of the temptation game resembles settings where players have a choice between
playing safe at some cost, or taking a risk of adding a \black mark." We briey discuss the California
criminal justice, driver's license suspension, tennis, baseball, and basketball below.
California criminal justice. California has a three-strikes-and-you-are-out rule for criminals: one
who gets convicted of three felonies gets jailed for life. In each period, a person can decide whether
to commit a crime or not. If she commits a crime, there is the chance of being caught. Following
our model, as she comes closer to getting put away for life (three convictions, hence three strikes),
she is less likely to commit a crime. Consistent with our model, she could have a payo from
the crime if she does not get caught, her temptation, which might be the expected amount of
money she would steal. In theory, recidivism rates in California should reveal a lesser propensity
to criminal activity after two felony convictions. Unfortunately, two signicant complications make
this evidence almost impossible to assess. First, criminals are heterogeneous as to type. Those
with two felony convictions presumably commit more crimes and are more likely to be caught, on
average, than those with only one. Second, there is evidence that some two-strike criminals have
migrated to other states.
Driver's licence suspension. In some states, there are penalties for getting certain numbers of
trac infractions, or a certain number of accidents. If a driver gets a certain number of trac
violations in a period, then her license is suspended. Note that the motor vehicle bureau does not
know how far a driver has traveled during that period, nor the level of temptation. (It may be
more tempting to speed when one is late for an important meeting.) However, this is only part of
the damage, since trac infractions also cause a boost in insurance rates. This suggests that if we
could ne people for a black mark in the temptation game, the additional instrument might aord
a superior outcome.
Tennis. A tennis-player gets two serves. This is equivalent to being allowed two black marks
before she is expelled (loses the point). On the rst serve, it is optimal to be more aggressive.
Indeed, the rst serve is typically aggressive. It is struck with power and placement to have a high
chance of winning the point outright or soon thereafter, assuming that it goes in. The second serve
is usually much more conservative | slower speed, less risky placement | to make it exceedingly13
likely to go in and thereby avoid a double fault. This strategy has important, albeit not exact,
parallels to being less willing to betray when one's reputation consists of more black marks in
the temptation game. One key dierence, of course, is that tennis is a game of strictly opposed
interests, in contrast to the temptation game. A second key dierence is that a betrayal is a certain
move, whereas whether a serve goes in is a probabilistic phenomenon.
Baseball. A related situation occurs in baseball. Holding the number of balls constant, batters
can aord to be more picky on pitches when they have no strikes than with one strike, and with
one strike than with two strikes.5
Basketball. In the NBA, if a player commits six personal fouls over the course of a game, he fouls
out and is disqualied from participation for the remainder of the game. This is a setting, like our
model, with imperfect monitoring. A player may get called for a foul that he did not commit, so
it is dangerous to get up to ve fouls. One of the features of basketball, but not the temptation
game, is that an infraction is also punished by giving out foul shots. This situation is similar to
the cumulative violations system in driving that was discussed above.
6. Optimal Cutos
This section identies the pure equilibria (as characterized by Lemma 2) that are most favorable
for the trusters, most favorable for the temptees, and that optimize social welfare. We rst discuss
how those three might be chosen among all possible equilibria in practice.
We might think of these three situations as ones where the two dierent parties, or some unin-
volved but benevolent coordinator, can select among the various possible equilibria. They may have
this capability because they can establish customs or laws that apply in a particular community,
or simply because they have the ability to communicate. Such communication can establish what
Schelling (1980) labels a focal point. Myerson (2009)6 comments on Schelling's insight: \anything
in a game's environment or history that focuses the players' attention on one equilibrium may
lead them to expect it, and so rationally to play it. This focal-point eect opens the door for
cultural and environmental factors to inuence rational economic behavior." Myerson goes on to
observe that: \Schelling's focal-point eect should be counted as one of the most important ideas
in social theory. Recognizing the fundamental problem of selecting among multiple equilibria can
help us to better understand the economic impact of culture on basic social phenomena such as
social relationships, property and justice, political authority and legitimacy, foundations of social
5 An opposite situation applies to the pitcher, of course. He must make more of an eort to get the ball over the plate
when there are more balls thus far, holding strikes constant, lest he walk the batter.
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institutions, reputations and commitment." Rosenthal and Landau (1979) study possible decision
rules or \customs" which players might use to determine their moves in a game as a function of





i 5, 2 0, 0
ii 0, 0 3, 6
Figure 2 A coordination game
Figure 2 shows a game matrix taken in spirit from Schelling. The two parties have a joint interest
in arriving at one of the two equilbria. One is superior for A and the other for B. Note also, as in
the game between trusters and temptees, that the equilibria are not symmetric. If one party can
verbally communicate, say A, he can simply say: \I will play i". If B takes this as a commitment,
he will play I, and A gets the payo at his superior equilibrium. Similarly, in our game, if only the
trusters can communicate, they can say to the temptees: \We will allow you one betrayal, but once
you get to two, no one will trust you." (That could be the equivalent of saying: \We will play i.") If
that message is transmitted, we would expect the temptees to behave as if b =1. Cheap talk in such
circumstances can determine which equilibrium is chosen: an equilibrium becomes focal because it
is \agreed on" through cheap talk, and it is then followed (Farrell 1987). See Crawford and Sobel
(1982) and Farrell and Rabin (1996) for detailed discussions on cheap talk for coordination games
and games of incomplete information.
Often the players on one side actually have the power to establish customs or laws that can
establish which equilibrium will prevail. For example, in most traditional societies men make the
rules relating to marital behavior, such as the punishment for indelity or the bases for divorce.
Similarly, banks have historically made the rules for lending practices. But we could imagine a
feminist movement changing the mores relating to marital behavior in a society7 or, in the wake
of the recent nancial meltdown, we could easily envision Congress remaking the rules on lending
to be more favorable to the consumer so as to maximize social welfare.
The temptation game diers from the normal multi-play, two-person game-theoretic situation,
in that players only meet any partner once. This probably makes it easier for an equilibrium, once
7 For instance, in Lysistrata by Aristophanes, the women of Greece try to change the rules regarding who makes
decisions about war. In particular, they withhold sexual privileges from their husbands as a means of forcing the men
to negotiate peace.15
identied, to stick. Posit that a particular pair of players A and B above were tied together for
many rounds, and that A had announced that he would play i. We could easily imagine that B
might try to break away from the upper-left equilibrium as the exclusive outcome. Thus, he might
alternate I and II, hoping that A would perceive the pattern and cooperate on sharing the big
payo.
Such a strategy would not make sense, however, when a specied A and B only meet once. In the
temptation game, players belong to identiable groups, which may give them additional incentive
to adhere to the rules set out in pre-game communications. If the players are to deviate from the
announced group behavior, they will possibly suer another type of reputation loss, with their
peers.
6.1. Equilibrium Selection by a Third Party
Consider a third party (such as an electronic marketplace) that wants to have the Cs and Ds play
some equilibrium b
M. This may either be an equilibrium that maximizes a weighted sum of payos
to the Cs and Ds, or an equilibrium that the third party prefers for some other reason (e.g., because
it maximizes the expected revenue of the marketplace). In the context of an electronic marketplace,
the Cs are the buyers who decide whether to trust sellers with certain reputation, and the Ds are
the sellers who decide whether to reward or betray. The electronic marketplace cannot force the
Cs and Ds to play a certain equilibrium, but can expel a D with a large number of black marks
from the marketplace.
If the marketplace sets the maximum number of allowed black marks to be equal to b
M, this
restricts the set of feasible equilibria to those with b 2 f0;1;:::;b
Mg. Moreover, the equilibrium
with cuto b
M becomes a focal point, and as a result the Cs and the Ds may be more likely to
play it. On the other hand, if the marketplace sets the maximum number of allowed black marks
to be equal to some number that does not correspond to an equilibrium of the temptation game
between the Cs and the Ds, then eectively the marketplace is not intervening and lets the players
choose which equilibrium will be played.
6.2. An Inequality Between Optimal Cutos
In the temptation game, posit that Cs, and only Cs have the ability to communicate verbally. They
will tell the Ds that they are employing the cuto in number of black marks that maximizes the
expected welfare of Cs assuming that Ds respond optimally to that cuto. On the other hand, if the
Ds have the power to choose the equilibrium | whether through communication or by setting the
rules or laws in some group | they will commit to their x*(b) for b2f0;1;:::;g, thus letting C pick16
his b in response; this produces the rst best condition for D. By Lemma 2, because C responds
to D's strategy in a predictable way, D is eectively choosing C's cuto b for him. The socially
optimal equilibrium emerges when a third party, perhaps a government agency or an e-commerce
site, proposes a set of strategies and associated equilibrium to optimize a weighted sum of the
payos going to C and D.
We dene b(C) and b(D) to be the optimal cutos for C and D respectively, that is, the cutos
of the pure equilibria that maximize the corresponding payos. We let b
(S) denote the cuto that
maximizes the sum of C's payo and  times D's payo, where 0. If  is equal to 1, then b
(S)
maximizes the total payo going to C and D. The following proposition shows that the optimal
numbers of betrayals will be greatest for the temptee, moderate for the social optimum, and least
for the truster.









pure is the maximum cuto that can arise at a pure equilibrium (for given f, s,
r and q). Proposition 2 tells us that the rst best equilibrium for D has the maximum possible
cuto. Intuitively, D prefers to be trusted longer. Moreover, if the rst best equilibrium for C has
the maximum possible cuto, then the equilibrium with b = B
pure is a social optimum. The rst
best equilibrium for C is the focus of the next two sections.
6.3. The Truster's Expected Payo
Consider a pure equilibrium (b;fx(b);b=0;:::;bg). Recall that w(b)P[X >x(b)] is the prob-
ability that player D betrays when she has b black marks. When C interacts with a D who has b
black marks, his expected payo is 1 2w(b) if b < b, and 0 if b = b. In light of Proposition 1,
this payo increases in b when b2f0;:::;b 1g. C's payo thus depends heavily on the number of
black marks of the D that he interacts with.
As far as C is concerned, the number of black marks of any D evolves according to a Markov
chain. The state is the number of black marks, which either increases by 1 (if C trusts D and a
betrayal is recorded), or remains the same (if either C trusts D and a reward is recorded or C
does not trust D), or becomes 0 (if D dies and thus is replaced with a new player with a blank
reputation).8 Let  be the steady state distribution of this Markov chain. The following lemma
gives C's expected payo and provides a way to compute .
8 If D dies, she is replaced with a dierent D, but that does not aect C's payo.17















Note that we make the Cs do a long-term maximization, which removes their lifespan from the
optimization. An alternative formulation leading to the same result would have the Cs start against
a long-term equilibrium distribution of Ds. If we do not do this, the rst generation of Cs might
put forth an equilibrium that would be superior for them, but inferior in the long run for Cs in
general, since they start in an anomalous situation where all Ds have b=0.
In the next section, we demonstrate that b(C) can involve the minimum (non-trivial) equilibrium
cuto, the maximum equilibrium cuto, or an interior solution. C does not care how long D lives,
since he is guaranteed to meet a new D each period. However, he is interested in inuencing the
behavior of D, and the subtleties of that inuence can yield these distinctive outcomes.
6.4. Numerical Examples
Proposition 2 shows that b(C)b(D). In this section we give some numerical examples to demon-
strate that both b(C)<b(D) and b(C)=b(D) are possible. For simplicity, we consider perfect
monitoring (i.e., r =q =0) and assume that the random variable X has a uniform distribution.


















Under perfect monitoring, (3) simplies to
v(b)=v(b+1)+x
(b)=s;













and the steady-state reputation distribution of the D population can be computed from the fol-










We use these equations to compute the expected payos of C and D at the equilibria in the
following examples.
Example 1. Assume that X is uniform on [0;20] and s = 0:95. Then B
pure = 4. C's payo is
maximized at b(C) = 1. That is, the one-betrayal-and-you-are-out strategy is best for Cs. This
is the strategy that many societies have employed to deal with marital indelities, particularly
those of women. D's payo on the other hand is maximized at b(D) = 4. Thus, in this case,
1=b(C)<b(D)=4.
Example 2. Assume that X is uniform on [0;30] and s = 0:95. Then, b(C) = 3 and b(D) =
B
pure =4.





Our analysis thus far has only considered pure-strategy equilibria. However, it is also possible to
study mixed-strategy equilibria in the same framework. In this section, we consider mixed strategies
for player C, where C trusts D with some probability that depends on her reputation. We consider
the same model as in section 3 and allow for imperfect monitoring, assuming that D's reputation
does not change in periods that she did not interact with a C because she was not trusted by the C
she was matched to.
We consider settings where C may use a mixed strategy: C's mixed strategy consists of the
probability he trusts D as a function of her reputation. This is a generalization of the pure strategy
where C trusts D with either probability 1 or probability 0. We do not consider mixed strategies
for player D here.9 Thus, D's strategy shows (as in the pure equilibrium case) whether she rewards
as a function of her reputation.
9 The results of the paper can be easily extended to consider mixed strategies for player D; such strategies would only
be relevant if X follows a discrete distribution. In particular, D would only randomize if X = x
(b). If X is drawn
from a continuous distribution (as we are assuming in this paper), X will be equal to x
(b) with zero probability, and
thus what D does at x
(b) does not aect the players' payos. If X is drawn from a discrete distribution, she could
mix optimally at most at one point (i.e., x
(b)).19
In Section 7.1, we characterize mixed-strategy equilibria. In particular, we give generalizations
of Lemmas 2 and 3 that allow for the truster to play a mixed strategy. In Section 7.2, we then
consider a special class of mixed equilibria, at which C trusts D strictly more than at any pure
equilibrium. We show that the temptee strictly prefers such an equilibrium to a pure equilibrium.
On the other hand, we conjecture that the truster is better o at a pure equilibrium.
7.1. Characterization of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
C's mixed strategy represents the probability he trusts D as a function of her reputation. Thus, C's
strategy is summarized by fp(b);b=0;1;:::g, where p(b) is the probability that C trusts D when
her reputation consists of b black marks. On the other hand, we do not consider mixed strategies
for player D; thus the set fx(b);b = 0;1;:::g represents D's strategy (as in the pure equilibrium
case)
Similarly to Lemma 2 we can characterize mixed equilibria.
Lemma 4. The sets fx(b);b = 0;1;:::g, fp(b);b = 0;1;:::g constitute an equilibrium if the fol-
lowing conditions are satised:













2. p(b) is a best response of C to D's strategy, i.e.,
 if x(b)>m then p(b)=1
 if x(b)=m then p(b)2[0;1]
 if x(b)<m then p(b)=0.
Pure equilibria are a special case of the mixed equilibria discussed here. In particular, if C either
trusts D with probability 1 or does not trust D (i.e., p(b)=1 for b<b), then Lemma 4 gives the
pure equilibrium conditions of Lemma 2. In particular, if p(b) = 1, then Equation (9) yields (4).
We note that Equation (8) is the same as (3), rewritten here for convenience.




In words, b is the cuto (in terms of the number of black marks) at which C does not trust D. If
D is never trusted when her reputation consists of b black marks, then she never has the chance
to reach more than b black marks.20
We already know that a nite cuto (after which C stops trusting D) is associated with every
pure equilibrium. The following lemma shows that this is also the case for mixed equilibria.
Lemma 5. For every equilibrium f(x(b);p(b));b = 0;1;:::g there exists a nite cuto b such
that p(b)>0 for b<b and p(b)=0.
Proposition 1 shows that for pure equilibria, x(b) is strictly increasing and convex for b in
f0;1;:::;b  1g. This is not the case for mixed equilibria in general, since at a mixed equilibrium
we may have x(b  1) = m and x(b) > m for b < b  1. However, the insights of Proposition 1
still hold if we do not consider the b's for which x(b)=m; this is discussed in Example 4 in Section
7.2.
We next show how C's expected payo is computed in a mixed equilibrium, by providing a
generalization of Lemma 3.
Lemma 6. Let (b;fp(b);b=1;2;:::;bg;fx(b);b=1;2;:::;bg) be an equilibrium. The expected
















7.2. Dominant Extend Equilibria
In this section we study a particular category of mixed equilibria that (when they exist) prolong
trust compared to pure equilibria. Recall that B
pure is the maximum cuto that arises in a pure
equilibrium. Then, at the best possible pure equilibrium for D, C trusts her until she has B
pure
black marks (by Proposition 2). Often, there exist mixed equilibria at which C always trusts D until
she has B
pure black marks and then at B
pure black marks he trusts her with some probability that
is strictly between 0 and 1. We call such equilibria dominant extend equilibria. A precise denition
is given below.
Definition 1. A dominant extend equilibrium satises




Figure 3 D's strategy at her preferred pure equilibrium (PE, shown with solid squares) and the dominant extend
equilibrium (DEE, shown with open circles) for perfect monitoring with s = 0:95 and X following the
uniform distribution on [0;20]. Details are given in Example 4.
 p(B
pure +1)=0
Denition 1 and Lemma 4 imply that at a dominant extend equilibrium, x(b)  m for b < B
pure
and x(B
pure) = m. Moreover, for b < B
pure, condition (9) of Lemma 4 simplies to (4) as in the
pure equilibrium case.
A dominant extend equilibrium gives D a longer expected lifetime, and, as the following propo-
sition shows, D always prefers a dominant extend equilibrium to any pure equilibrium.
Proposition 3. D strictly prefers a dominant extend equilibrium to a pure equilibrium.
Dominant extend equilibria are always attractive to D, because D's expected payo is maximized
the longer she can expect to live. Thus, rather than being expelled for sure at b=B
pure, she would
prefer to have a probabilistic chance there, with expulsion at b=B
pure +1.
On the other hand, we conjecture that player C always prefers a pure equilibrium to a dominant
extend equilibrium. Our intuition for this is as follows. Consider the pure equilibrium with the
maximum cuto and the dominant extend equilibrium. We use the subscripts PE and DEE to









Lemma 8 in the Appendix shows that wPE(b)wDEE(b). On the other hand, the number of states
is larger at the dominant extend equilibrium, suggesting that (10) is plausible. We conducted22
extensive simulations that support this claim.
If player C always prefers a pure equilibrium, and C is the one that species which equilibrium
will be played, then we will have a pure equilibrium. On the other hand, pure equilibria often tend
to arise as focal points because of their simplicity (Myerson 1997).
The following example illustrates the discussion on dominant extend equilibria.
Example 4. Assume that s = 0:95 and X follows the uniform distribution on [0;20]. We have
seen in Example 1 that the maximum possible cuto at a pure equilibrium is B
pure = 4. At the
best pure equilibrium for D, C trusts her when she has fewer than 4 black marks, and D's expected
payo is 60.18. However, there also exists a dominant extend equilibrium where C trusts D with
probability 0.15 when she has 4 black marks, yielding an expected payo of 65.07 for D.
On the other hand, C's expected payo at the dominant extend equilibrium is 0.15, which is
signicantly smaller than his expected payo at any (non-trivial | with a non-zero cuto) pure
equilibrium. In particular, C's payo ranges between 0.45 and 0.54 at the pure equilibria. Thus, if
the truster is the one that chooses which equilibrium will be played, then a pure equilibrium will
be chosen.
The values of x(b) are shown in Figure 3 for both the pure and the dominant extend equilibria.
We observe that x(b) is increasing and convex for b=0;1;:::;B
pure 1. We already know that this
is true for pure equilibria by Proposition 1; a similar proof shows that this is always the case for
dominant extend equilibria.
8. Mechanisms that also Track the Number of Transactions
This paper has focused thus far on black mark reputation mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that
only keep track of the number of recorded betrayals. In this section, we extend the reputation
mechanism to also include information on the number of transactions. We show that if the number
of transactions is recorded, the maximum number of black marks that C allows D at a pure equilib-
rium does not increase compared to the case where the number of transactions is not recorded. In
particular, at a pure equilibrium, C will never trust D once she has B
pure black marks | regardless
of whether C knows the number of transactions of D.
We assume that D's reputation consists of the number of black marks b and the number of
transactions (which we denote by n) that she has completed. We thus denote D's reputation by
(b;n). A strategy of player C in this more general model consists of a cuto for each number of
transactions. With a slight abuse of notation, let b(n) be the cuto for n transactions, that is, C
does not trust D at (b;n) if b  b(n). On the other hand, D's strategy will consist of a threshold23
x(b;n) for every possible reputation (b;n). That is, when D has b black marks in n transactions,
then she betrays if the strength of her temptation to betray (i.e., the realization of X) exceeds the
threshold x(b;n).
We next give equilibrium conditions10 for this two-dimensional reputation model.
Lemma 7. The sets fb(n);n = 0;1;:::g and fx(b;n);b = 0;1;:::;b(n);n = 0;1;:::g constitute a
pure equilibrium of the temptation game if the following conditions are satised:
1. x(b;n) is a best response of D to C's strategy, i.e., there exists a function v(b;n) such that










(n);n)=0 for all n: (13)
2. b(n) is a best response of C to D's strategy, i.e.,
 x(b;n)m for b<b(n)
 x(b;n)m
We note that Lemma 7 is a generalization of Lemma 2. In particular, if we set b(n) = b
where b B
pure, then we get an equilibrium of the two-dimensional reputation mechanism, which
corresponds to an equilibrium of the one-dimensional mechanism; in this case, b(n) is a constant
that does not vary with the number of transactions n. However, in the two-dimensional case, there
also exist equilibria where b(n) varies with n.
We next show two fundamental properties of b(n). First, b(n) is non-decreasing in n. This is
an intuitive property: the larger the number of transactions of D, the larger the number of black
marks that C will tolerate. Second, b(n) is upper-bounded by B
pure, i.e., the maximum cuto for
which there exists a pure equilibrium when reputation only consists of the number of black marks.
Even though the number of transactions is recorded in the two-dimensional reputation case, C does
not allow D to commit more betrayals than in the one-dimensional case (at a pure equilibrium).
Proposition 4. If reputation consists of both the number of black marks b and the number of
transactions n, then at any pure equilibrium of the temptation game
10 The derivation of the equilibrium conditions of Lemma 7 is similar to the derivation of the conditions of Lemma 2
in section 4.24
(i) b(n) is non-decreasing
(ii) b(n)B
pure for all n
The fact that b(n) is upper-bounded by B
pure may at rst seem counterintuitive. One could
expect that C would allow D more black marks when he knows that she has completed a very large
number of transactions than when he has no information on the number of transactions. However,
if C tolerated a large number of transactions, then D would betray with high probability, since
one more betrayal would make a small dierence in her future expected payments. This would
be similar to a reputation mechanism that aggregates ratings over the lifetime of the temptee;
an approach that has been shown to be ineective in a number of settings (e.g., Fan, Tan, and
Whinston 2005, Aperjis and Johari 2010a, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson 2004).
We get some additional intuition for why b(n) is upper-bounded by B
pure by considering the
steps of the proof. We rst observe that b(n) cannot be very large; if it were, D would not be
properly incentivized at (0;n). In particular, even though betraying at (0;n) would bring her closer
to expulsion, expulsion would be so far in the future that D would not reward with a suciently
large probability (i.e., she would use a small x(b;n)), and C on his side would not trust her. Now,
given that b(n) is upper bounded and increasing, we conclude that b(n) is constant for all large n,
which means that the number of transactions does not play any role after some point. Then, after a
suciently large number of transactions, this two-dimensional problem is equivalent to the setting
where only the number of black marks is included in D's reputation. As a result, the number of
black marks that C tolerates does not exceed B
pure.
As mentioned above, after a certain number of transactions b(n) becomes constant. Then, the
thresholds x(b;n) correspond to thresholds of a one-dimensional equilibrium. Thus, after that point
D is less likely to betray when she has more betrayals (x(b;n) is increasing in b). However, x(b;n)
may not be increasing in b for small values of n when there is a high probability of misrecording a
betrayal.11
9. Reputations in Long-Term Relationships
Our analysis above is cast in terms of situations where one contracts with another party for just one
period, and then moves on. Reputations, possibly imperfect, carry all available information about
the temptee. The analysis can be extended to a situation where one contracts with the same party,
period after period. Here too reputations may be imperfect. Thus, in a romantic relationship, one
11 We thank John H. Lindsey II for constructing an example where x
(b;n) > x
(b + 1;n) and b + 1 < b
(n) at an
equilibrium.25
may not know whether one's partner has cheated,12 and any instance of betrayal may only come to
light probabilistically. Even if indelity is revealed, the relationship may not terminate, as anyone
who has read advice columns | which are peppered with questions on whether one should leave
a cheating partner | knows well. And the rules for terminating a relationship may depend solely
on the number of black marks, with players receiving a warning after one or more betrayals has
come to light. Business relationships may have much the same character. A may continue with B
as a supplier if B fails to deliver on a contract once, or even twice, but he surely has a breaking
point where he goes out to seek a new source.
To analyze situations with long-term relationships, we need to specify what happens after a
relationship is terminated. In particular, what happens to C after he stops trusting D? Depending
on the setting, C may not be able to interact with another D in the future, or may be able to nd
a new partner, possibly by incurring a search cost. On the other hand, D may also be able to nd
a new partner once C terminates their relationship.
Here, we briey illustrate how the results of this paper can be extended to long-term relationships.
Suppose that neither C nor D is able to nd a new partner once their relationship is terminated.
Then, D's expected payo is given by the dynamic program considered in this paper (Equation (4)
for pure equilibria and Equation (9) for mixed equilibria). On the other hand, C trusts D as long as
x(b)  m. Thus, the pure equilibria of this game with long-term relationships are again given by
Lemma 2, and the mixed equilibria are given by Lemma 4. The only thing that changes for long-
term relationships is C's expected payo, which is no longer given by Lemma 3, since C interacts
with the same partner in every period.
10. Conclusion
This paper studies how reputations work when the truster's decision to trust is based only on the
number of recorded betrayals of the temptee (black mark reputation mechanism). We nd that at
a pure equilibrium, the greater the number of black marks, the less likely the temptee is to betray.
This insight applies to a broad range of situations including agencies for consumer protection and
online review sites. Our analysis assumes that all players on one side of the market are identical in
terms of morals, self-control, and payo structure; thus setting aside any information about types.
However, we expect our insights to carry on to situations with players of dierent types as long as
the dierences across types are relatively small.
12 We recognize that, contrary to our model, people do dier on propensities to cheat, and there therefore would also
be learning about types.26
Black mark reputations approximate settings where buyers focus on the number of negatives |
even if more reputation information is provided. The Availability Heuristic (Tversky and Kahnen-
man 1973) leads individuals to judge the frequency of an event by how easily they can bring an
instance to mind. This heuristic leads individuals to give signicant weight to extreme bad out-
comes. Recognizing this, we have been told that in the venture capital industry, executives work
extremely hard to prevent portfolio companies from going bankrupt, even though that same time
devoted to protable ventures would yield greater benets to both the executives and the investors.
The VC executives recognize that their world is an approximation of the betrayals world, where
embarrassing strikeouts are remembered, and batting averages are sometimes forgotten.
We recognize that to accurately describe some interactions between trusters and temptees, the
model of this paper would have to be elaborated. We show in Section 8 that the same qualitative
results apply in the long run when the number of transactions is also recorded as part of a temptee's
reputation. Two further extensions suggest themselves immediately. First, some relationships have
a natural termination or sunset date quite apart from black marks. Thus, for a college and a student,
rules infractions | plagiarism or disorderly behavior | would be the equivalent of betrayals.
But once graduation occurs, the relationship is ended no matter what. Second, many long-term
relationships | and some one-time-only relationships | have both parties trusting and both
parties tempted. Thus, the business and its supplier or the husband and the wife may both rely on
each other; each has a reputation and each can betray.
Across a wide swath of societal concerns, we live with the notion that a single betrayal does not
end a relationship. Thus, there are second chances (and possibly more). Religions routinely allow
for forgiveness. \The God I believe in is a God of second chances," Bill Clinton once said, referring
to his own shortcomings. And George W. Bush, not known for being soft on crime, observed:
\America is the land of the second chance | and when the gates of the prison open, the path
ahead should lead to a better life." That is the way two successive Presidents outlined the theme
that motivated this analysis: The game of life accommodates betrayals, but not without putting
betrayers on warning.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider some  2f1;:::;b 1g. The optimal strategy of D when starting at
 is fx(b);b=;:::;b 1g. We now consider  1, and assume that D uses the following strategy:
at    1 she rewards if X < x(), at  she rewards if X < x( +1),..., at b   1 she rewards if
X < x(b  2), and at b  1 she rewards for any X. That is, she uses the optimal strategy for 
starting at   1 and then always rewards if her reputation consists of b 1 betrayals. Up to (and
including) state b  2, this yields payo v() since everything is the same as when starting at .
Then, D reaches state b   1 with positive probability and gets a strictly positive payment once
she is there. Therefore, when starting at  1 the described strategy yields a strictly higher payo
than v(); thus v(  1)>v().
Proof of Proposition 1: We rst show that x(b) is strictly increasing in b for b 2 f0;:::;b  1g.












Let b1 <b2, and let x1 =x(b1) and x2 =x(b2) be the corresponding solutions of (14). Then,
1 s(1 q)
s(1 r q)




x2 +(1 s)v(b2 +1)=1+E[(X  x2)
+]: (16)











which contradicts (16). We note that the rst inequality follows because v is decreasing in b (by
Lemma 1) and s < 1; the equality follows from (15), and the second inequality holds because
x1 x2. We conclude that x1 <x2, and thus x(b) is strictly increasing in b for b2f0;1;:::;b 1g.






We observe that g0(y) =  (1   F(y)), where F(y) 
R y
 1f(x)dx is the cumulative distribution
function of the random variable X. This implies that g0(y) is negative and increasing in y, and




















































which contradicts (17). We note that the rst inequality holds because g is convex, the second
inequality is a consequence of x(b1)   x(b1   1) > x(b2)   x(b2   1), and the third inequality
holds because g is decreasing. Thus, x(b) x(b 1) is nondecreasing in b and x(b) is convex for
b2f0;1;:::;b  1g.
Proof of Proposition 2: We rst show that b(D)=B
pure. Let u(b;b) be equal to v(b) when the
cuto b is used. We observe that u(b;b) only depends on the dierence b  b (given the same s,
r and q), and is increasing in b  b. Thus, u(0;b) is maximized when b is maximized.
Now that we have shown that b(C)b(D), how about the socially optimal equilibrium b
(S)
which optimizes the weighted return of C and D? Because the return for D decreases when b
decreases, it is not possible that b
(S) < b(C), because both players would be better o with
b
(S) = b(C). It is also not possible that b
(S) > b(D), because b(D) is the highest b possible
in the equilibrium set. Then we have b(C)b
(S)b(D) for all 0.
Proof of Lemma 3: Let (i) be the probability that a randomly chosen D player has i betrayals.
For i=0 the balance equation is:
(0)=s((1 q)(1 w(0))+rw(0))(0)+(1 s):31
In particular, when D has no betrayals, she rewards with probability 1   w(0) and betrays with
probability w(0). If she rewards, her reputation remains at b = 0 with probability 1   q; if she
betrays, her reputation remains at b = 0 with probability r. Finally, from any state, there is a
transition to 0 with probability 1 s.
Similarly, for b2f1;:::;b  1g we have
(b)=s(q(1 w(b 1))+(1 r)w(b 1))(b 1)+s((1 q)(1 w(b))+rw(b))(b)
Solving for (0) and (b) we get (6) and (7) respectively.
Proof of Lemma 4: Let p(b) be the probability that C trusts D when D has b betrayals. As






In particular, with probability p(b), C trusts D and then D chooses whether to reward or betray.
On the other hand, with probability 1  p(b), C does not trust D. In that case, D receives zero
payment in this period and her reputation remains the same.













These equations yield (8) and (9).
We next consider player C. As before, C trusts D if P[X > x(b)] > 1=2; C does not trust D if
P[X > x(b)] < 1=2; and C is indierent between trusting and not trusting if P[X > x(b)] = 1=2.
Thus, if x(b)>m, then C plays p(b)=1; if x(b)= m, any p(b) 2[0;1] is a best response for C;
and if x(b)<m, then C plays p(b)=0.



























which cannot hold if v(0)=1, since EX <1 and p(0)1. We conclude that there always exists
a nite cuto.
Proof of Lemma 6: Let (b) be the probability that a randomly chosen D player has b betrayals.




In particular, when D has no betrayals, C trusts her with probability p(0). If D is trusted, then
she rewards with probability 1   w(0) and betrays with probability w(0). If she rewards, her
reputation remains at b = 0 with probability 1 q; if she betrays, her reputation remains at b = 0
with probability r. Finally, from any state, there is a transition to 0 with probability 1 s.






Solving for (0) and (b), we get the equations of the lemma.





If p(b) is strictly between 0 and 1, then x(b) = m and w(b) = 1=2, and thus C's expected payo





Proof of Proposition 3: We show that D's payo is strictly greater at a dominant extend equilib-
rium. Consider the pure equilibrium with b = B
pure, and suppose that D's strategy is fx(b);b =
0;1;:::;b   1g. Let vPE(0) be D's expected payo at this pure equilibrium. Now suppose there
exists a dominant extend equilibrium with cuto b = B
pure +1. D's expected payo in the dom-
inant extend equilibrium will be at least as much as the payo she would get by using x(b) for
b=0;1;:::;B
pure  1 and always rewarding at B
pure. This strategy yields payo vPE(0) up to state
B
pure   1. Then, D reaches a reputation of B
pure betrayals with positive probability; and once33
she has B
pure betrayals, C trusts her with positive probability. Thus, in expectation she gets a
strictly positive payo once she has B
pure betrayals. Therefore, D's payo at the dominant extend
equilibrium is strictly greater than her payo at a pure equilibrium.
Lemma 8. For b2f0;1;:::;B
pure  1g, wPE(b)wDEE(b).
Proof: It suces to show that x
PE(i)x
DEE(i), since w is decreasing in x.







Since the left-hand side is increasing in x(b) and the right-hand side is decreasing in x(b), the
solution x(b) decreases as v(b+1) increases. (The formal proof of this is similar to the rst part of


















 Induction Step: Suppose that x
PE(i) > x
SE(i) and vPE(i + 1) < vDEE(i + 1). Then, by (4),
vPE(i)<vDEE(i), which in turn implies that x
PE(i 1)>x
DEE(i 1) and completes the induction
step.
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose that b(n) > b(n+1). Suppose that D has b(n+1) betrayals
and n transactions. C will trust D in this state, because b(n)>b(n+1). However, D knows that
whatever she does in this period, C will not trust her in the next period. So then, it is optimal
for her to betray. But if D betrays, C has no reason to trust. So it must be that b(n)b(n+1),
which shows (i).






Consider an equilibrium where C's strategy is given by fb(n)g and D's strategy is fx(b;n)g
and suppose that there exists some n with b(n) > K. A necessary condition for this to be an
equilibrium is that x(0;n)  m. We show that D is better o using some strategy fx(b;n)g with
x(0;n) < m. In particular, consider a strategy with x(b;n0) = x(b;n0) for n0 > n. Suppose that
D's current reputation is (0;n) and let x be the current realization of X. If D betrays now, her
current payment will increase by x. We next upper bound the amount that D will lose by betraying
now. First observe that the earlier time that D may be expelled is K periods later. This is a very34
conservative estimate, because D will probably not always betray and b(n) may be increasing. We
next observe that D misses at most 1 + EX in expectation for each period after she is expelled.
Considering that D only survives with probability s in every period, in total she misses at most
(1+EX)=(1 s). But this payment is at least K periods away, so she discounts it by at most sK.













So D is better o using x(0;n)<m.
Thus, for any given problem there exists some constant upper bound on b(n). We already know
that b(n) is non-decreasing, so there must exist a  n and a  b such that b(n) = b for n   n. Then,
after  n the exact number of transactions does not aect the cuto (which is constant). Without
loss of generality, we can restrict the state-space to
f(b;n):bb
(n);n<  ng[f(b; n):b bg;
which is nite.
For n<  n, equations (11), (12), and (13) need to be satised. For n=  n, we have
v(b; n)=1+s(1 q)v(b; n)+sq v(b+1; n)+E[(X  x
(b; n))
+] for b< b;
x
(b; n)=s(1 r q)(v(b; n) v(b+1; n)) for b< b;
v( b; n)=0:
Observe that  n is just a dummy variable in the previous equations. More importantly, if we ignore
 n these are exactly equations (1), (3), and (4), that is, the equations we had in the one-dimensional
case, where D's reputation consisted only of the number of betrayals. This observation implies that
 bB
pure, and also b(n)B
pure, which concludes the proof for (ii).